

Lessons from the Varanus Is Incident

CEDA

12 November 2008

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Dampier Bunbury Pipeline**




Dampier to Bunbury Natural Gas Pipeline

- ❖ DBNGP is Australia's largest natural gas pipeline
- ❖ Approx 1600km from Dampier to Capel
- ❖ Approx 50% duplicated
- ❖ 26 inch diameter
- ❖ 8,480kPa Max Allowable Operating Pressure
- ❖ 10 compressor stations with 26 compressor units - 216MW installed power
- ❖ 4 inlet points
- ❖ 55 outlet points
- ❖ Daily deliveries ~850TJ/day



Gas Received into DBNGP

- ❖ Total receipts from all inlets
- ❖ Up to 3 June, add ~100TJ/day into GGP
- ❖ Fluctuations caused by:
 - NWSG production issues
 - Varying LPG content
 - Matching production with demand





Gas Delivered from DBNGP

Pilbara and Goldfields

- Total impact includes ~100TJ/day GGP load included from 4 June
- ❖ Early movers to secure alternative supplies
- ❖ Relatively price elastic
- ❖ Gas vs distillate vs no production equation
- ❖ Adjusted to “new reality” within 3 weeks


South West

- ❖ Slower to react
- ❖ Price sensitive market
 - Retail gas
 - Retail electricity
 - Trade exposed industries
- ❖ Securing gas as / when available
- ❖ Fluctuating residential demand
 - Doing the right thing
 - Weather became cold mid-June



DBNGP Operations

- ❖ Started with optimum linepack and stable operations
 - Best scenario if there is going to be a problem
- ❖ Able to support balancing between production and demand
- ❖ Some instability from mid-June as residential load became less predictable
- ❖ No threat to deliveries



- ❖ Secure operations
 - Station personnel at CS1, 2, 3 for immediate response
 - Reschedule non-essential works
 - ❖ Communications between infrastructure operators
 - Western Power (electricity system)
 - AlintaGas Networks (gas distribution)
 - Epic Energy (Pilbara Pipeline System)
 - APA Group (Goldfields and Parmelia Pipelines)
 - ❖ Maximise receipt capability
 - Operate CS1, 2, 3 to match NWSG pressure
 - Allow NWSG to flow at maximum rate
 - Release from minimum delivery pressure obligations
 - Receipt capability >750TJ/day
 - ❖ Emergency Services
 - Inlet Relocation – allows Varanus Is customers to receive gas at NWSG
 - Park & Loan – match variations between purchases and demands
 - Data for government to monitor overall situation
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Key Impacts

- ❖ 2 major industrial plants shut down for duration
 - ❖ Small / medium industries production curtailed
 - Day to day uncertainty
 - Difficulties in switching suppliers
 - Bulletin Board provided opportunities for small trades at margin
 - ❖ Increased costs for power generation & industry
 - Alternative fuels – challenges in supply, transport and price
 - 3 coal plants unavailable
 - Short term gas supplies at high prices
 - ❖ Residential customers doing the right thing
 - Short / cold showers
 - Reduced heating, lighting
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Lessons Learned

- ❖ DBNGP emergency response worked well
 - Good operating state at start
 - ❖ Good response from (most) shippers
 - Early communication of issues
 - ❖ Co-operation between infrastructure operators
 - ❖ Use worst case assumptions
 - Allowed continuing stable operations for duration
 - Gradually introduce flexibility for shippers as impacts are understood
 - ❖ Information flow limited due to commercial confidentiality
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Discussion Issues

- ❖ Gas Supply System Emergency is extreme reaction so not invoked
 - ❖ Market mechanisms function for “big” players
 - Trading experience
 - Fuel options
 - ❖ Can retailers match demand with supply with price for small industrial / commercial sector?
 - Challenges in process for gas customers to switch suppliers
 - Bulletin Board allowed small trades at the margin
 - ❖ Is mitigation economically feasible?
 - Gas storage – how much and where?
 - Underground
 - Pipeline
 - LNG
 - Alternative fuels
 - Liquids were effective in bridging the gap – at a price
 - Who finances mitigation?
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